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Clemson, SC 29634-0978, USA.
Q1. What first stimulated your interest in the foundations of quantum
mechanics?
It so happens that I studied general relativity before I studied quantum the-
ory. This seems to have affected my reaction to the latter. It surprised me that
quantum theory uses the same elementary degrees of freedom as classical physics
does – position, momentum, angular momentum, and so on. Nor are any radically
new degrees of freedom introduced (with the possible exception of spin). Classical
variables are promoted to operators. The values are restricted to eigenvalues. But
the set of elementary variables is the same as in classical physics. General relativ-
ity, in contrast, abandons Newtonian gravitational force, and introduces the new
concept of curved spacetime. The basic ontology changes. I had expected quan-
tum theory to be in a sense much more novel than it is. But the basic variables
are unchanged, only subject to an operator calculus that is itself constructed by
analogy with classical physics. In this sense, the theory talks about nonclassical
systems as if they were still classical.
My experience with general relativity had led me to expect that quantum the-
ory would be based on, as I would now put it, a different ontology from that of
classical physics. I was disappointed that there was no new, distinctively quantum
entity. There is the wave function, of course, but it seemed just to give proba-
bilities for values to be taken by the usual set of classical variables. I was also
impressed by the conceptual leap that Faraday had made in developing the con-
cept of the electromagnetic field. This was a novel and non-Newtonian ontology,
a fundamentally new kind of thing. What comparable new concept did quantum
theory introduce? None that I could see.
Then I remember the first time I encountered an explicit statement of the
collapse postulate. The book I read said something about how when a system is
observed it is ‘thrown into’ an eigenstate. How could merely looking at something
make it jump around like that?
As an undergraduate, I read Ballentine’s famous 1970 review of the statistical
interpretation, and was impressed to see so many muddles cleared up. However,
1This paper collects into one place my replies to the questions posed by Maximilian
Schlosshauer in his interview volume about the foundations of quantum mechanics, Elegance
and Enigma: The Quantum Interviews, ed. M. Schlosshauer (Springer, 2011).
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it pointed to something deeper, along the lines of hidden variables, and by itself
could not be satisfactory. I also read a bit about de Broglie-Bohm theory, but
unfortunately the papers I read contained obvious mistakes and this led me to
think the theory was wrong or at best incomplete.
Later on, during some years I spent outside academia after graduating, I be-
came deeply impressed by quantum nonlocality, and in particular by the puzzle of
why we can’t use it for instantaneous signalling. In the 1980s, some people were
still proposing ways to use EPR correlations for signalling, and of course it would
always be shown by someone else that the proposals were wrong. The no-cloning
theorem, for example, arose in response to such a proposal. I couldn’t shake off
the feeling that there was something nonlocal going on behind the scenes, and that
quantum uncertainty noise was preventing us from seeing it. By means of Bell’s
theorem, we could deduce that the nonlocality was there, but the uncertainty
principle stopped us from using it for signalling. This was my strong impression.
Shimony referred to this sort of thing as a ‘peaceful co-existence’ between rela-
tivity and quantum theory. To me, it seemed like a dark and uneasy conspiracy
that cried out for an explanation.
I started to form the vague idea that the hidden-variable level must be in a
state of some sort of statistical equilibrium, in which the nonlocal effects average
to zero. In ordinary statistical mechanics, thermal equilibrium yields finely-tuned
relations such as detailed balancing, the fluctuation-dissipation theorem, and so
on. I was also fascinated by an analogy with Maxwell’s demon, who is unable
to sort fast and slow gas molecules only because he is in thermal equilibrium
with the gas and is therefore subject to the same thermal noise as the molecules
themselves. I started to think that something similar must be going on at the
hidden-variable level – that we are unable to control the details of hidden variables
because we are ourselves stuck in an equilibrium state. I had vague ideas about a
hypothetical ‘subquantum demon’, who could predict outcomes of spin measure-
ments more accurately than quantum theory allows, and who could thereby use
EPR correlations for nonlocal signalling. But I didn’t have a real theory. This
must have been around 1988. It was only when I studied de Broglie-Bohm theory
properly, in early 1990, that I saw a concrete way to realise the idea.
Q2. What are the most pressing problems in the foundations of quan-
tum mechanics today?
The interpretation of quantum mechanics is a wide open question, so we can’t
say in advance what the most pressing problems are. As the history of physics
shows, it’s only in hindsight that one can say who was looking in the right di-
rection. What’s important is that we leave the smokescreen of the Copenhagen
interpretation well behind us, and that talented and knowledgeable people think
hard about this subject from a realist perspective.
Instead of answering the question, I can offer a list of things I’d like to see
done in the near future, as they seem important as far as I can tell.
It would be good if the ongoing controversy over the consistency of the Everett
intepretation could be settled. It would be helpful to know if that theory really
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makes sense (on its own terms) or not. It would also be good to see further
experiments searching for wave function collapse. More generally, I’d like to see
more experiments that test quantum theory in genuinely new domains – as in the
recent three-slit experiment.
In modern theoretical physics, there are a number of important issues that
deserve more attention from a foundations perspective, such as the question of
Hawking information loss in black holes, and the problem of time in quantum
gravity. The description of the quantum-to-classical transition in the early uni-
verse also deserves more foundational scrutiny.
As for my own current line of research – which focusses on the possibility of
nonequilibrium violations of quantum theory, in de Broglie-Bohm theory and in
deterministic hidden-variables theories generally – there are some outstanding is-
sues that need a lot more work. One is the need for more detailed calculations and
numerical simulations of relaxation to quantum equilibrium in the early universe,
with the aim of obtaining precise predictions of where residual nonequilibrium
violations of quantum theory might be found today, for example in the cosmic
microwave background or in relic cosmological particles. My work so far points in
the direction of super-Hubble wavelengths as the area to look at, but much more
remains to be done. I have also made some proposals to the effect that Hawk-
ing radiation could consist of nonequilibrium particles that violate the Born rule,
in a way that might avoid information loss, and there are a host of theoretical
questions to be investigated to develop that proposal further.
Finally, there is the important general question of whether it’s possible to con-
struct a reasonable hidden-variables theory without an ontological wave function.
De Broglie-Bohm theory has several features that have been shown to be common
to all hidden-variables theories (under some reasonable assumptions): nonlocal-
ity, contextuality, and nonequilibrium superluminal signalling. De Broglie-Bohm
theory also has the feature of an ontological wave function, and it would be good
to know if this is another common feature of hidden-variables theories or not.
Alberto Montina has worked on this recently, but more needs to be done.
Q3. What interpretive program can make the best sense of quantum
mechanics, and why?
In my view, the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation – or pilot-wave theory, as de
Broglie originally called it – presents several deeply attractive features, in addition
to the obvious merits of being realistic and deterministic.
First and foremost, as I said in my answer to Question 1, before I studied de
Broglie-Bohm theory properly, I was very puzzled by why we can’t use quantum
nonlocality for signalling. It was as if there was some sort of conspiracy at work
in the laws of physics. To explain this, I had drawn the conclusion that we were
stuck in some sort of statistical equilibrium state whereby uncertainty noise hap-
pens to mask the underlying nonlocal effects (a kind of equilibrium ‘balancing’
condition, as I had vaguely thought of it). When I studied pilot-wave theory
and saw that it was a consistent theory, I was amazed to see that it provided a
precise realisation of what I had been looking for: it was a nonlocal theory, for
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which the nonlocality was washed out or averaged to zero in the state of ‘quan-
tum equilibrium’ – the state in which the hidden configurations have a Born-rule
distribution. Other people working on the theory usually took the Born proba-
bility rule as an axiom, alongside the equations of motion, but to me it seemed
obvious that the theory should be considered for arbitrary distributions. I was
able to show that such distributions give rise to nonlocal signals at the statistical
level. I also proved an analogue of the classical coarse-graining H -theorem, which
gave a general understanding of how evolution towards equilibrium occurs for an
isolated system, as has since been confirmed by numerical simulations. It seemed
natural to me to suppose that relaxation to equilibrium had taken place in the
remote past, presumably soon after the big bang. The nonlocality associated with
early nonequilibrium might then explain why the early universe was so homoge-
neous. More importantly, the puzzle of why we can’t use quantum nonlocality
for signalling could be given a simple answer: it’s a peculiarity of the fact that
we happen to be stuck in an equilibrium state. There’s no conspiracy in the laws
of physics, we are simply trapped in a special state with special properties. Both
signal-locality and the uncertainty principle could be shown to be contingencies
of equilibrium.2
This viewpoint opens up the possibility of a new and wider ‘nonequilibrium’
physics, in which superluminal signalling is possible and the uncertainty principle
can be circumvented. Relativity, too, is violated in this new physics, which con-
tains a notion of absolute simultaneity associated with a preferred state of rest.
Nonequilibrium particles that violate the Born rule could exist today, perhaps in
the form of relic particles from the very early universe – particles that decoupled
before they had time to relax completely to equilibrium. I’ve also speculated that
nonequilibrium particles might be generated by evaporating black holes, on the
grounds that their states could then carry more information and possibly avoid
the Hawking information loss.
I find pilot-wave theory attractive in another respect. In de Broglie’s original
formulation, it is a radically non-Newtonian theory, with the extraordinary fea-
ture of a wave in configuration space, that determines the velocities of systems
instead of their accelerations. It’s an Aristotelian dynamics, with a natural Aris-
totelian kinematics. Nonlocality in ordinary space is explained as an effect of the
configuration-space dynamics. This seems to me much more like the radical con-
ceptual shift I had expected when I first studied quantum theory (see my answer
to Question 1). We throw out classical forces and classical dynamics, introduce
a new and radical entity (the pilot wave in configuration space), and construct
a new theory of motion. That’s the sort of thing that Faraday and Maxwell did
with the electromagnetic field in the nineteenth century, and that Einstein did
with gravity in 1915. And that’s what de Broglie did in the 1920s.
In 1923, de Broglie concluded that, when a particle is diffracted by an obstacle
without touching it, the non-rectilinear motion violates Newton’s first law. De
Broglie proposed a new form of dynamics based on velocities, in which particle
2A. Valentini, ‘Signal-locality, uncertainty, and the subquantum H -Theorem. I and II’, Phys.
Lett. A 156, 5; 158, 1 (1991).
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motions were guided by waves, in a way that unified the variational principles
of Maupertuis and Fermat. But de Broglie’s achievement went unnoticed. He is
remembered chiefly for the relation between momentum and wavelength, but that
was merely a by-product of his new dynamics. Even those who work on his theory
often fail to credit de Broglie – who in 1927 had the full many-body dynamics in
configuration space, not just the one-body theory as is often claimed.3
Unfortunately, in 1952, Bohm presented the theory in a pseudo-Newtonian
form, based on acceleration and the quantum potential, which made it look much
more like classical physics than it really was. Bohm’s important contribution was
to show how the theory accounts for the general quantum theory of measurement.
But I never took Bohm’s version of the dynamics seriously. It looks artificial, like
writing classical general relativity in terms of flat spacetime with a tensor field
that distorts rods and clocks. It can be done, but it’s not a natural language
to use. De Broglie’s original dynamics, which Bell used and advertised, seems
much more appropriate. In recent work with Samuel Colin, we have shown that
Bohm’s dynamics is actually unstable, in the sense that non-standard momentum
distributions (which are allowed in Bohm’s dynamics but not in de Broglie’s) do
not relax to quantum equilibrium. So my preference for de Broglie’s dynamics
is no longer merely a question of taste. I think Bohm’s dynamics is actually
untenable.
De Broglie’s remarkable work in the 1920s remains mostly unknown, even
among historians. In my view, in certain key respects, he understood the funda-
mental dynamics better than Bohm did. Matters are further confused by some
who refer to de Broglie’s dynamics as ‘Bohmian mechanics’. For a proper under-
standing of the theory, it helps to know how and why de Broglie constructed it in
the 1920s – instead of thinking of it anachronistically in terms of a ‘completion’
of modern quantum theory. In my view, the theory is still widely misunderstood,
even by some of its most fervent supporters, partly because de Broglie’s original
work is still being ignored. Associating the theory primarily with Bohm is not
only wrong as regards credit, it also deprives us of de Broglie’s insights.
While de Broglie’s dynamics is attractive in itself, for me it has always been
first and foremost a means to provide a concrete model of the idea I had about
physicists being trapped in an equilibrium state that hides nonlocality. I thought
from the outset that the essence of this idea would hold in any reasonable de-
terministic hidden-variables theory – as I eventually showed explicitly. Now, at
present, we don’t know what the true hidden-variables theory is. Pilot-wave the-
ory might be right or approximately right; of course, it could also be quite wrong.
I think it’s a worthy guess, as it contains a number of features, such as nonlocality,
that are known to be generally true for hidden-variables theories. But to find out
what the correct theory is, we’ll need an empirical window.
I tend to compare pilot-wave theory with the early models of the kinetic theory
of gases, in which molecules were hard spheres. That was the simplest assumption
to make, and it was a good strategy to develop the resulting theory as far as
3G. Bacciagaluppi and A. Valentini, Quantum Theory at the Crossroads: Reconsidering the
1927 Solvay Conference (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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possible, until things like the explanation of Brownian motion gave us an empirical
window onto the world of atoms. Similarly, I hope that developing pilot-wave
theory to its logical conclusions will lead to an empirical window onto the world
of hidden variables.
I wouldn’t be willing to bet a huge sum that the details of pilot-wave dynamics
are correct. However, I would be willing to bet a considerable sum that there is
a nonlocal hidden-variables theory behind quantum mechanics, and that the only
reason we can’t send superluminal signals today is because we’re trapped in a state
in which the hidden variables have an equilibrium distribution. Locality and the
uncertainty principle are not laws, they are merely peculiarities of equilibrium.
Quantum theory is a special case of a much wider, nonequilibrium physics, in
which nonlocal signalling is possible and the uncertainty principle can be beaten.
I think this is likely to be true. And it’s a good scientific rule of thumb to say that,
if the laws of physics permit something to happen, then it will happen somewhere.
So, I expect that nonequilibrium violations of quantum theory will eventually be
found. When they are found, and we are able to see our way through the fog
of quantum noise, what will we find? Will we see trajectories obeying pilot-wave
dynamics? Maybe, maybe not. But we will, I think, see a nonlocal world radically
different from the world we’re familiar with. And we will realise how misled we’ve
been all this time, wrongly thinking that the Born rule and its associated features
are fundamental when they are not.
Q4. What are quantum states?
In my view, de Broglie’s pilot wave is a new kind of causal agent, a radically
new kind of physical entity grounded in configuration space. To understand it,
it’s helpful to examine the historical parallel with two other physical entities
that seemed mysterious when first introduced: Newton’s concept of gravitational
attraction-at-a-distance, and Faraday’s concept of field.
Before the acceptance of Newtonian gravity, it seemed to many that scien-
tific explanation should be reduced to Cartesian action-by-contact. If one body
appeared to act on another at a distance, there must be an intervening medium
that transmits the force through local action by contact. In Newtonian gravity,
instead, a massive body can act directly on another at a distance, through empty
space. Even Newton himself had difficulty with the idea, and continued to seek a
deeper explanation for gravity in terms of an aetherial medium filling space. The
concept of gravitational attraction arose by a process of abstraction, in which the
conceptual scaffolding of a Cartesian medium was thrown away. A similar step
occurred in the nineteenth century, when Faraday introduced the concept of field.
Faraday looked at the pattern of iron filings around a bar magnet, and started to
think that the pattern would exist even if the filings were taken away. It’s hard for
us today to appreciate what a conceptual leap that was. Remember, at that time,
a force was understood to be present when a mass accelerates. In empty space,
where there are no masses, how could a force exist all by itself? But Faraday
believed that the magnetic ‘lines of force’ seen in patterns of iron filings existed
in their own right, even when the filings were absent. We eventually got used to
the idea of forces existing and even propagating in empty space, where there are
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no masses or charges. Again, the concept arose by a process of abstraction. By
abtracting away the iron filings, we’re left with the concept of fields in their own
right.
Now, in my view, history repeated itself in 1927, when de Broglie introduced
the concept of a pilot wave in configuration space. Again, it arose by a process of
abstraction. In particular, early in 1927 he was struggling with a model he had
of a system of particles as singularities of coupled fields in three-space. He was
trying to show that the singularities would follow the guidance equation, which
was supposed to emerge as an effective description of the motions, which were
ultimately generated by the complicated coupled field equations. But he saw
that, as a provisional theory, he could simply take the guidance equation with
the pilot wave in configuration space, and forget about the underlying model
– just as Newton did with gravity, and just as Faraday and others did with
electromagnetism. The difference, though, is that while we all recognise Newton
and Faraday for their achievements, most physicists and historians simply don’t
know what de Broglie really did in the 1920s. I believe that, in 1927, de Broglie
introduced a fundamentally new entity into physics, but to this day the world
hasn’t really noticed, and even those who are interested in his theory do not
properly understand what de Broglie did. And of course, to complete the analogy,
particularly with Newton, de Broglie himself was uncomfortable with the idea,
and thought it should emerge as an effective theory along the lines he had been
considering – a view he returned to in later life. He never really believed the pilot
wave in configuration space was fundamental, just as Newton never believed that
his theory of gravity was fundamental. Still, Newton’s concept lasted for more
than two hundred years.
In my view, de Broglie’s pilot-wave concept deserves to be taken more seriously.
It might turn out to be useful-but-wrong, like Newton’s concept of gravitational
attraction-at-a-distance. Or, it might turn out to be an essential new concept –
as happened with Faraday’s concept of field, which survives even in quantum field
theory. In any case, at present, I would suggest that the wave function is a new
kind of causal agent, as new and radical as was Faraday’s concept of field, but
which for historical reasons has not been recognised.
To see how radical it is, consider the contrast with the idea of a field in
space. An ordinary field can be probed using a test particle. An electric field,
for example, can be measured by introducing an infinitesimal test charge and
watching it accelerate. But if we try to do this for the pilot wave, we find that
introducing a test particle actually increases the dimension of the configuration
space on which the wave is defined. There is no such thing as a test particle for
the pilot wave. So it’s not comparable to ordinary fields, something that Bohm
didn’t really appreciate in 1952, but which de Broglie understood in 1927.
We may need to learn to think in terms of pilot waves, just as earlier gener-
ations learned to think in terms of fields, without a conceptual scaffolding based
on more primitive notions. In particular, the pilot wave in configuration space
provides a natural understanding of nonlocality in 3-space.
Finally, I should comment on the notion of pilot wave for the whole universe.
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Aside from gaps in our understanding of quantum gravity, I see nothing prob-
lematic there. Some people claim that, because there is ‘only one universe’, the
universal pilot wave cannot be contingent, and must instead be law-like. But
that argument is spurious. In our current understanding of cosmology, the inter-
galactic magnetic field is not determined by physical laws – it is contingent, in
the sense that, for all we know, the configuration of that field could have been
different. The same goes for the spacetime geometry of the universe as a whole.
And the same can be said of the universal pilot wave.
Q5. Does quantum mechanics imply irreducible randomness in nature?
Certainly not. There is at least one formulation of quantum mechanics –
the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm – that has no such randomness,
therefore the conclusion cannot be drawn.
Pilot-wave theory has been extended to cover high-energy physics, with dif-
ferent approaches taken by different authors. In the best approach, in my view,
bosons are described in terms of c-number fields, while fermions are particles with
a pilot wave obeying the many-body Dirac equation. For fermions, we have to
take the Dirac sea seriously. Even the vacuum is full of particles. This model
was proposed by Bohm and Hiley, and its relation to quantum field theory has
been clarified by Colin and Struyve. This, together with the bosonic field theory,
provides a completely deterministic theory of high-energy physics, including pro-
cesses such as pair creation. Some workers have proposed models of fermions in
which pair creation has a fundamentally stochastic element, but those models are
unnecessarily cumbersome. It would be odd if pair creation forced indetermin-
ism upon us. It is in fact straightforward to construct a completely deterministic
theory of such processes.
Within pilot-wave theory, it has been claimed that the Born rule has a fun-
damental status as a preferred measure of ‘typicality’ for the initial configuration
of the universe. If this were so, in practice we would always be stuck with ran-
domness for subsystems. But that argument inserts the Born rule by hand at the
initial time. As I’ve said (in my reply to Question 3), the theory certainly allows
for ‘nonequilibrium’ violations of the Born rule. Such violations for subsystems are
‘untypical’ with respect to the global Born-rule measure. But to claim that they
are therefore intrinsically unlikely is circular, because such violations are readily
shown to be ‘typical’ with respect to non-Born-rule measures. Also, I don’t see a
difference between ‘typicality’ and ‘probability’. To say that we will always have
Born-rule randomness in practice, as some have argued, is in my view mistaken.
There is no good reason to believe that. On the contrary, if one takes the theory
seriously, it suggests that nonequilibrium will eventually be found somewhere, as
I urged in my reply to Question 3.
I have shown that quantum nonequilibrium systems could be used to perform
‘subquantum measurements’ on ordinary systems.4 These are measurements that
violate the uncertainty principle and other standard quantum constraints. An
4A. Valentini, ‘Subquantum information and computation’, Pramana – J. Phys. 59, 269
(2002).
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extreme nonequilibrium ensemble, with arbitrarily small dispersion, could be used
to perform analogues of the ideal, non-disturbing measurements familiar from
classical physics. These would allow us to track the trajectories without disturbing
the wave function, and to predict the future in ways that are not allowed by
quantum theory. In other words, quantum randomness could be circumvented in
the laboratory, if we possessed such nonequilibrium systems. And it’s conceivable
that such systems could exist today, in the form of relic particles from the very
early universe (see my answer to Question 11).
Q6. Quantum probabilities: subjective or objective?
From a de Broglie-Bohm point of view, the situation is more or less the same
as in classical statistical mechanics. At the fundamental level, there is no such
thing as probability. The universe contains a huge number of degrees of freedom
evolving according to deterministic equations of motion. In principle, that’s all
there is to it. In practice, for large numbers of similar and approximately inde-
pendent systems, it’s useful to work with a distribution of configurations, and to
consider the theoretical limit of an infinite ensemble. This is only a practical tool.
The interpretation of that distribution depends on what approach you take to
probability theory. This leads to interesting questions in the foundations of prob-
ability theory, but those questions have nothing particularly to do with pilot-wave
theory, they arise in a similar way in ordinary classical statistical mechanics.
Because the theory is fundamentally deterministic, it may seem natural to
characterise a probabilistic description as ‘subjective’. On the other hand, the
statistics we see in the lab are properties of the actual configuration of our uni-
verse, so in that sense they are ‘objective’.
Questions about the foundations of probability theory arise not only in statisti-
cal mechanics, but in any application of probability theory or statistical inference,
for example to genetic populations on earth or to the distribution of galaxies in
deep space. De Broglie-Bohm theory has nothing new to add to such debates,
and so I try to avoid them.
We should avoid getting distracted by such questions in a de Broglie-Bohm
context, when the focus should be on finding evidence for the details of the un-
derlying dynamics. There’s a parallel with atomic physics in the late nineteenth
century. Boltzmann’s central belief was that everything was made of atoms, and
that macroscopic physics could be reduced to atomic physics. In retrospect, it’s a
pity that he got distracted by controversies relating to the foundations of proba-
bility theory, as well as by questions concerning time reversal, and so on, when the
priority was to find evidence for atoms. Similarly, while I agree that conceptual
questions about the meaning of probability are interesting, I think that in the
context of pilot-wave theory they are at best distracting us from more important
issues, and at worst obscuring the physics of the theory – which is fundamentally
a nonequilibrium physics that violates quantum mechanics.
As an example of the sort of thing I mean, some people in quantum foundations
talk as if it is problematic to consider probabilities for the ‘whole universe’. And
yet, cosmologists not only do so every day, they are also busy testing primordial
probabilities experimentally by measuring temperature anisotropies in the cosmic
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microwave background. By making statistical assumptions about a theoretical
‘ensemble of universes’, cosmologists are able to test probabilities in the early
universe, such as those predicted by quantum field theory for vacuum fluctuations
during inflation. One can question what the ensemble of universes refers to. Is
it a subjective probability distribution? Or, is the universe we see in fact a
member of a huge and perhaps infinite ensemble, as is the case in theories of
eternal inflation? Those are interesting questions, but only tangentially related
to the ongoing experimental tests. This point is related to my critique, in my
answer to Question 4, of supposed problems with contingency for the universal
wave function. I don’t see why people working in quantum foundations should
worry about such matters in a cosmological context, when cosmologists do not.
Q7. The quantum measurement problem: serious roadblock or dissolv-
able pseudo-issue?
The measurement problem is often stated as the problem of the interpretation
of a quantum superposition, such as Schro¨dinger’s cat. That is inaccurate and
misleading. Among other things, it allows for the facile response that the wave
function refers only to a statistical ensemble. However, while such a ‘statistical’
or ‘epistemic’ interpretation might turn out to be correct, it does not solve the
true and deep measurement problem, which is the problem of what happens to
macroscopic realism at microscopic scales. In quantum physics, we have definite
states of reality at the macroscopic level but not at the microscopic level. There
is no precisely-defined boundary between these two domains. Therefore, standard
quantum theory is fundamentally ill-defined.
An apparatus pointer in the lab, for example, points in a definite direction.
Particles, on the other hand, generally have indefinite positions. How many par-
ticles are required to make a ‘macroscopic’ pointer? How many are required, to
cross the line from microscopic fuzziness to macroscopic definiteness? There is
no precise dividing line between the microscopic and the macroscopic. And all
macroscopic equipment is built out of microscopic systems. How do definite states
arise from indefinite ones? There’s a temptation here to think in terms of emer-
gence, but there can be no continuous transition from indefinite to definite states
of reality. Either something exists or it does not.
Some people say that there are ‘degrees of reality’, that one object can be
‘more real’ or ‘less real’ than another. One sometimes hears physicists ask if a
rock somewhere out in deep space is real when no one is looking at it. But such
talk misunderstands the nature of the word ‘real’. When we say that ‘X is real’,
we simply mean that ‘X exists’. If I say there is a rock out in deep space with no
one looking at it, I have already stated that the rock exists, that is, I’ve already
said the rock is real. To then suggest that perhaps the rock is not real, because
no one is looking at it, is to contradict oneself. An analytical philosopher would
probably convey this point by saying that ‘real’ is a quantifier, not a property.
But the point is simple enough, and is the basis of much elementary reasoning,
both in physics and outside of it.
Others try to evade the measurement problem by claiming that the usual no-
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tion of ontology depends on a ‘God’s-eye view’ of the world. But that is mistaken.
For example, if a piece of macroscopic apparatus, with a dial and a pointer, has
a particular setting and pointer reading, this is not dependent on anyone’s (or
God’s) ‘viewpoint’, it is simply a fact about the dial and pointer. Facts require
neither a human observer nor a deity. They are facts, whether or not we or God
or whoever is there to know them.
Other attempts to avoid the issue include recourse to nonclassical logic. One
can invent a mathematical structure that violates some rules of formal logic and
call it a ‘logic’. However, everyone still uses so-called classical logic in order
to reason and argue. I think there’s a misuse of words here. Logic is logic.
If there’s a contradiction, for example in a thought experiment such as that of
Wigner’s friend, then it won’t do to dismiss it as a failure of classical logic. The
contradiction comes from clear thinking, and requires a clear answer.
Finally, some people say that the concept of objective reality must be aban-
doned even at the macroscopic level. But we each know that we exist, and if we
have any sense we will know that other minds exist as well. There is a world out
there, containing other human beings, as well as things like tables and chairs, and
pieces of equipment with dials and pointers.
To make quantum mechanics a precise theory, we must posit the existence of
something that extends into the microscopic domain. This can and has been done
in various ways, involving hidden variables, or many worlds, or collapse theories.
It remains to be seen which, if any, of these proposals are correct.
To suggest that the measurement problem is a pseudo-issue is to say that the
simple question ‘what is real?’, or equivalently ‘what exists?’, does not require
an answer. When people say that, they are being inconsistent, because they
themselves talk about ‘what is real’ or ‘what exists’ when it comes to things
like the outcomes of experiments in their laboratories, or what car they own.
Everyone uses the notion of definite states of objective reality at the macroscopic
level, including in the laboratory – when it is asserted, for example, that we really
did find a certain wavy pattern of dots on a photographic film in an interference
experiment. It’s only at the microscopic or quantum level that there is controversy
over what is real. To say that we don’t need a notion of microscopic reality at
all, while at the same time using a notion of macroscopic reality whenever one
describes an experiment, is to ignore the self-evident ambiguity in the dividing
line between microscopic and macroscopic, and to ignore the resulting self-evident
ambiguity in what one is saying.
Q8. What do the experimentally observed violations of Bell’s inequal-
ities tell us about nature?
The observed violations of Bell’s inequality tell us that locality is violated –
if we assume that there is no backwards causation and that there are not many
worlds.
There is a widespread misunderstanding that Bell’s theorem assumes deter-
minism or the existence of hidden variables. In fact, Bell’s original 1964 argument
had two parts. The first part uses the EPR argument to show that, if locality is
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assumed, then quantum outcomes must be determined in advance. The second
part takes this deduction as a starting point, and goes on to prove the famous
inequality. As Bell himself emphasised, determinism is not assumed, it is deduced
from locality in the first part of the argument. So the contradiction is not only
between hidden variables and locality. There is a contradiction between quan-
tum theory itself and locality (in the absence of backwards causation and many
worlds).
If we allow for backwards causation, so that future apparatus settings can
affect systems in the past, then it seems that nonlocality is not required. It’s
unfortunate that very little work has been done developing such models to cover
a broad range of physics, so we don’t know if plausible and attractive theories
along these lines exist. As for many worlds, it’s a possibility – in my view unlikely,
but possible – though whether that theory is well-defined remains controversial.
Q9. What contributions to the foundations of quantum mechanics have
or may come from quantum information theory? What notion of ‘in-
formation’ could serve as a rigorous basis for progress in foundations?
In my view, with the rise of quantum information theory in the 1990s, the
subject of quantum foundations was set back by at least 20 years. There are,
however, some issues that need to be clearly distinguished.
First of all, quantum information theory is just quantum mechanics applied
to certain practical problems. Nothing new is said about ontology, and the usual
ambiguities remain. No attempt is made even to address the measurement prob-
lem.
On the other hand, quantum information theory has emphasised some aspects
of quantum theory that had been unduly neglected. In particular, entanglement,
peculiarities of the tensor product structure of Hilbert space, and general prop-
erties of unitary evolution such as the no-cloning theorem. What these features
have in common is that they don’t depend on details of the system or on what its
Hamiltonian happens to be. Some people find this exciting. But in fact, systems
do consist of particles and fields, and these propagate in spacetime, and there are
various symmetries associated with conservation laws, and so on, and all this re-
mains the basic stuff of physics. It should also be remembered that entanglement
as the fundamental new feature of quantum physics was discussed by Schro¨dinger
as long ago as 1935, quantum cryptography was anticipated by Wiesner around
1969, and explicit statements of the no-cloning theorem date from 1982. Much of
the basic and truly important material is not as novel as is often claimed. What
has really happened is that these features have turned out to be of technological
interest, and the resulting outpouring of funding has generated a huge bandwagon.
As far as fundamental physics is concerned, I see a useful parallel with what
happened in general relativity in the 1960s, when people discovered that some im-
portant deductions could be made purely on the basis of geometrical arguments,
without invoking the details of Einstein’s field equations. I mean results like the
singularity theorems of Penrose and Hawking. Modern textbooks on general rela-
tivity include a chapter on such geometrical methods – containing, in particular, a
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few key results such as the singularity theorems, and a few useful theorems about
global hyperbolicity and causal structure. But still, most of what we know and
understand about Einsteinian gravity comes from analysis of the field equations.
Now, the parallel with quantum information theory is clear. It was realised that
some important deductions could be made purely from geometrical or kinematical
properties of unitary evolution in Hilbert space. The details of the Schro¨dinger
equation or Hamiltonian didn’t matter. It will soon be standard for introductory
textbooks on quantum mechanics to contain a chapter giving a few key results
such as the no-cloning theorem and one or two useful theorems about entan-
glement. But still, most of what we know about quantum physics comes from
analysis of the theory applied to concrete systems of electrons, photons, atoms,
and so on, and the detailed structure of the Hamiltonian is of central importance.
But the real damage that has been done is in reviving the misguided idea that
physics is only about macroscopic operations and observations. A sort of ‘neo-
Copenhagen’ attitude has arisen, with the word ‘information’ playing a role similar
to the older word ‘observation’. The usual ambiguities remain. Macroscopic
equipment with its definite ontological states plays a fundamental role, while no
ontology is provided at the microscopic level, and with no heed paid to the lack
of a clear dividing line between those two levels. The measurement problem is
simply not addressed.
It is sometimes claimed that ‘information’ is a fundamental new concept. But
‘information’ is synonomous with ‘knowledge about something’. What is the
knowledge about? If it is only about macroscopic instrument readings, then it is
not knowledge of anything fundamental.
I see quantum information theory as also analogous to thermodynamics. In
the late nineteenth century, some people thought that they had found a new
approach to physics, that focussed on the production, transmission and use of
energy, based on general principles that didn’t depend on details of the system.
In retrospect, of course, gases and liquids are made out of atoms and molecules,
and their macroscopic behaviour is not fundamental but emergent. Nowadays,
some people claim that physics is about the production, transmission and use
of information, based on general principles that don’t depend on details of the
system. But again, the systems we see are built out of microscopic entities, and
the behaviour of macroscopic instruments is not fundamental but emergent.
Q10. How can the foundations of quantum mechanics benefit from ap-
proaches that reconstruct quantum mechanics from fundamental prin-
ciples? Can reconstruction reduce the need for interpretation?
I don’t think quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory. It’s ambiguous.
And it’s ambiguous because it lacks a microscopic ontology. Any reconstruction
that does not provide such an ontology will remain ambiguous and therefore not
fundamental. We see this in work over the past decade or so, reconstructing quan-
tum theory from various operational axioms. Those axioms refer only to outcomes
of experiments performed with macroscopic equipment. They provide constraints
on the statistical properties of those outcomes. This may be of some interest,
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but only up to a point. Nothing is said about fundamental ontology. Pieces of
macroscopic equipment are treated as if they were fundamental or elementary
objects, when in reality they are emergent objects built out of atoms, particles,
and fields. The pieces of equipment are assigned definite ontological states – the
pointers point in definite directions, the knobs and dials on the apparatus have
definite readings, and so on – while microscopic systems are not. Nothing is said
about the dividing line between the definite macroscopic world and the indefinite
microscopic world. Therefore, these operational approaches remain fundamen-
tally vague. They do not attempt to address the measurement problem, therefore
they are of limited interest.
Pilot-wave dynamics, in contrast, does provide a reconstruction of quantum
mechanics in terms of a fundamental ontology that is equally valid at the macro-
scopic and microscopic levels. There are two simple equations of motion, de
Broglie’s guidance equation and Schro¨dinger’s wave equation. As with other fun-
damental equations of physics – such as Maxwell’s equations or Einstein’s field
equations – one can try to motivate these equations on the basis of simple physical
principles. In the early 1920s, de Broglie motivated his guidance equation as a
way to unify the principles of Maupertuis and Fermat. The Schro¨dinger equation
is the simplest wave equation that respects the nonrelativistic dispersion rela-
tions. Thus, simple physical principles suggest two general equations of motion,
which – if an initial Born-rule distribution is assumed – provide a complete and
unambiguous reconstruction of quantum mechanics as an emergent equilibrium
phenomenology. Though I wouldn’t put too much emphasis on the motivating
principles. At the end of the day, the basis of the theory is the equations them-
selves.
As for reducing the need for interpretation, that happens only if we provide
an ontology. The question being asked probably refers to reconstruction along
operationalist lines, which has become fashionable in recent years. As I’ve ex-
plained, that work does not even attempt to address the measurement problem.
People often draw an analogy with special relativity. In 1905, Einstein gave an
operational treatment based on macroscopic rods, clocks, and light beams, and
he derived the Lorentz transformation from a small number of simple principles.
Current work in operational quantum theory seeks to emulate that. In my view,
Einstein’s famous 1905 paper is the historical source of a serious mistake, whereby
macroscopic equipment is given a fundamental role – a mistake that was repeated
by Bohr, Heisenberg and others in the 1920s, with catastrophic consequences.
Like any other piece of macroscopic equipment, rods and clocks are not elemen-
tary systems, they are emergent objects built out of particles and fields. Our
modern understanding of Lorentz invariance, commonly described in textbooks
on high-energy physics and quantum field theory, boils down to having a La-
grangian density that is a Lorentz scalar. It’s a symmetry of the basic equations.
There is no mention of rods and clocks, or of any principle about the speed of
light – the photon could, after all, turn out to have a small mass and move at
slightly sub-luminal speeds. I think Einstein’s 1905 paper was deeply damaging,
and continues to be so. Nor was it necessary. The structure of special relativity
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was independently derived by Poincare´ in 1905, by generalising the Lorentz in-
variance of Maxwell’s equations to all the laws of nature – precisely the approach
that a modern particle physicist would have taken. I see little to emulate in Ein-
stein’s first paper on special relativity, and much to deplore. Einstein himself
deeply regretted the operational fashion he started in that paper.
I see different formulations of operational quantum theory as analogous to dif-
ferent formulations of thermodynamics. People can argue over whether Kelvin’s
formulation of the second law is better than that of Clausius, or whether Carathe´odory’s
geometrical approach is to be preferred. But in the end, they are merely talk-
ing about different axiomatisations of the same phenomenological theory, none of
which bears on the burning issue of fundamental ontology.
Q11. If you could choose one experiment, regardless of its current
technical feasibility, to help answer a foundational question, which one
would it be?
There are at least five different experiments that I would be keen to do, all of
them involving tests of the Born probability rule.5
First, I would like to test the Born rule for particles that have been emitted
by an evaporating black hole. This could be done at least in principle, should
we discover primordial black holes, left over from the early universe, that are
currently evaporating. I would also like to test the Born rule for particles that are
entangled with partners that have fallen behind the event horizon of a black hole.
This might be possible, if we find appropriate atomic cascade emissions taking
place naturally in the neighbourhood of a supermassive black hole. I would also
be keen on testing the Born rule for any kind of particle at the Planck scale.
The motivation for these three experiments is my suggestion that the quantum
equilibrium state might become unstable in the presence of gravity.
Another worthwhile place to look, in my view, is in the neighbourhood of
nodes of the wave function, where the de Broglie-Bohm dynamics breaks down.
The fifth experiment I’m keen on is to test the Born rule for relic cosmologi-
cal particles that decoupled (at early times) when their wavelengths were larger
than the instantaneous Hubble radius. By analysis of the relaxation process on
expanding space, I’ve shown that relaxation can be suppressed at super-Hubble
wavelengths, so it’s possible that such particles never underwent relaxation – they
could still exist in our universe today, and violate the usual rules of quantum me-
chanics. Specifically, I would suggest testing their polarisation probabilities, for
the particles themselves or for their decay products, and to search for violations
of Malus’ law. Since I have to choose only one experiment, let it be this last one.
Q12. If you have a preferred interpretation of quantum mechanics,
what would it take to make you switch sides?
The observation of spontaneous collapse would of course make me switch to
collapse theories. If nonequilibrium violations of quantum theory, as I envisage
them, are not observed, say over the next 100 years, then I would start to have
5A. Valentini, ‘Astrophysical and cosmological tests of quantum theory’, J. Phys. A: Math.
Theor. 40, 3285 (2007).
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serious doubts about hidden variables (were I still alive). I don’t think the equilib-
rium de Broglie-Bohm theory by itself is scientifically satisfactory, even if logically
it is a possibility, because the details of the trajectories can never be tested even in
principle. I might consider Everett’s theory, if it can be shown to be conceptually
coherent.
I might also change my views, if someone made important progress in theoreti-
cal physics – for example about information loss in black holes, or about quantum
gravity – for which a particular interpretation played a crucial role.
Q13. How do personal beliefs and values influence one’s choice of in-
terpretation?
It can be interesting and insightful to ask where people’s ideas and preferences
come from, but only up to a point. In the end, what counts is how the ideas stand
up to theoretical and experimental scrutiny.
What I find more interesting is why you ask this question. It’s a peculiar
question to ask a scientist. The whole point of science is to arrive at objective
truth, by a combination of reason and experiment, and to leave personal beliefs
by the wayside. Not to say that it’s easy. But imagine asking a biologist how
‘personal beliefs and values’ affect the interpretation of fossils. Or a condensed
matter physicist, regarding the interpretation of superconductivity. The question
would seem peculiar, and an insinuation that the person being questioned was
or might be behaving unscientifically by allowing personal beliefs to cloud their
judgement.
Dennis Sciama used to say that, when it comes to the interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics, ‘the standard of argument suddenly drops to zero’. It’s still a
field that is often short on argument and long on prejudice. It’s as if the usual
rules of rational, scientific argument tend to be suspended in this area. What
have ‘personal beliefs and values’ got to do with a scientific discussion?
It might be claimed that the question is reasonable in the context of quantum
foundations, where there are different and radically divergent interpretations. But
our present uncertainty is no reason for compromising basic standards. We should
focus on arguments and evidence, not on beliefs. The whole point of science is to
get away from mere belief.
Some will say that realism in physics amounts to a ‘belief’ or ‘value’, but that
is confused and mistaken.
It is true that personal beliefs, values, and inclinations can provide motivation
and inspiration for new ideas or for following a certain road. In principle, there’s
nothing wrong with that. Perhaps it’s even necessary, if one is going to make a
serious effort exploring an idea. But again, once ideas or research directions have
been thought of and decided on, one has to find out if there is any theoretical
or experimental support for them. I don’t think it’s scientifically healthy to give
much weight to why someone thought of something or why they’re attracted to
exploring a certain idea, as it distracts from the scientific heart of the matter –
which is whether or not the idea itself makes sense and is correct.
I would say that the widespread neglect of objectivity and realism in quantum
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physics has contributed to an erosion of the idea of science as finding out what
the world is really made of and how it works. The objective world is oblivious to
our personal beliefs. Doubts about the existence of the former tend to foster an
emphasis on the importance of the latter. Actually, the roots of this go back to
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which saw the rise of German
idealism as a force in philosophy. The development of quantum mechanics itself,
in the 1920s, shows traces of its influence, with an emphasis on the subjective
knowledge of the human observer as opposed to objective reality.
Some people are uncomfortable with the objective and rational world of sci-
ence, which is sometimes seen as an impersonal world devoid of human meaning,
with no room for religious or spiritual belief. Sometimes, this is what lies behind
an attraction to subjective, non-ontological interpretations of quantum physics.
This seems to have been the case for some of the founding quantum physicists,
certainly in the case of Wolfgang Pauli. But the trouble with subjective, non-
ontological interpretations is not so much the motivation that sometimes lies
behind them, but the fact that they don’t make sense (see my discussion of the
measurement problem in my answer to Question 7).
Q14. What is the role of philosophy in advancing our understanding
of the foundations of quantum mechanics?
I would say that our thinking about quantum physics became muddled in the
1920s, under the influence of certain incorrect philosophical ideas that were fash-
ionable in some circles at the time. I think physicists need to un-learn some of
those wrong ideas, in order to return to clear scientific thinking about quantum
theory. In this, some exposure to analytical philosophy can be helpful. For exam-
ple, any graduate student in the subject knows that, if anything, indeterminism
makes free will even harder to explain, since our actions would be occurring for
no reason, and yet one often hears physicists citing our apparent free will as a
reason for abandoning determinism.
On the other hand, if people in quantum foundations would start thinking like
other physicists and scientists do – in terms of an objective reality that we need
to discover – there would be little need for philosophy. For example, spectroscopic
analysis enables us to deduce the chemical composition of the stars, despite Au-
guste Comte’s infamous claim in the nineteenth century that this would never be
possible. Yet, astrophysicists don’t need to study philosophy. Similarly, biolo-
gists and geologists have deduced that certain events occurred on earth millions
of years ago, without worrying about philosophical questions.
I’ve already mentioned, in my answer to Question 13, the unfortunate effects of
German idealism on scientific thought. That philosophical movement was deeply
influential in Denmark, as well as in the German-speaking world. It was sparked
off by the publication in 1781 of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, a work that
was widely interpreted as having undone the Copernican revolution and having
restored human beings to a central place in the order of things, a claim that
was later repeated in 1927 with the rise of quantum mechanics. Kant, like many
others of his time, believed that Newton had discovered the true physics. On
the other hand, David Hume argued that certain knowledge about the world was
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impossible to acquire. Kant was faced with a paradox. How had Newton done
it? Kant’s ingenious answer, as least as widely interpreted, was that Newtonian
physics reflected the structure of human thought, not the structure of the world,
and that the world ‘in itself’ was unknowable. Now, a lot happened between 1781
and 1927. But if we ask why Bohr and Heisenberg took seriously the absurd idea
that experiments must be described in terms of classical physics – a claim that
is easily refuted by describing experiments in terms of, for example, de Broglie’s
nonclassical pilot-wave dynamics of 1927 – then the answer is that they took seri-
ously the bizarre Kantian claim that classical physics is essential to the structure
of human thought. In order to clear away such wrong-headed ideas, it helps to
know where they came from and why they were proposed. For this purpose, a
knowledge of the history of philosophy can be helpful.
Another wrong idea that needs clearing away is operationalism. This has
roots in the philosophy of Ernst Mach, and entered physics with the publication
of Einstein’s first relativity paper in 1905. For the first time, the human observer
seemed to play a central role in physics. More substantially, as I’ve already
said in my answer to Question 10, Einstein made the fatal mistake of treating
macroscopic equipment – in Einstein’s case, rods and clocks – as if they were
fundamental objects, when in fact they are emergent and approximate objects
built out of more elementary things such as particles and fields. The widespread
respect for Einstein’s approach seemed to justify Bohr’s subsequent belief that
classical apparatus played a fundamental role in quantum theory, even though
any apparatus is built out of nonclassical atoms. Another mistake propagated
by Einstein’s first paper, at least as it was widely interpreted, is the idea that
physics should be based only on what is observable, when in fact, as Einstein
later explained to Heisenberg in a private conversation in 1926, some body of
theory is required before we can even know how to make reliable observations –
what we can observe is determined by the theory, not the other way round. To
correct these kinds of mistakes, analytical philosophy can be helpful.
But at the end of the day, what is needed, essentially, is clear and objective
scientific thinking, of the sort exemplified by Bell – what was once normal practice,
among people like Maxwell, Boltzmann, and de Broglie, for example, and what
to this day remains normal practice in almost every branch of science, including
physics. The essential point, shared by almost all scientists, is that there is a real
world, and that it is the task of science to find out about it. In the narrow context
of quantum foundations I would say that, for the most part, we need to un-learn
some bad philosophical ideas that have become associated with the subject, and
which scientists in other areas would never take seriously.
Q15. What new input and perspectives for the foundations of quantum
mechanics may come from the interplay between quantum theory and
gravity/relativity, and from the search for a unified theory?
There has, of course, already been a lot of input. Work in quantum grav-
ity often has a cosmological setting, where in the very early universe the lack
of an external classical background makes textbook quantum theory inadequate.
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This was, historically, one of the motivations for the Everett interpretation. To-
day, according to inflationary cosmology, the remnants of primordial quantum
fluctuations are imprinted on the cosmic microwave background, and a proper
understanding of the quantum-to-classical transition during the inflationary era
again forces us to think beyond the textbooks. In the context of a theory like
inflation, which is currently being tested experimentally, the Copenhagen inter-
pretation can’t be taken seriously. Quantum foundations needs to catch up with
what has been going on elsewhere in fundamental physics and cosmology. How
can we, for example, return to something like ‘operational quantum theory’, which
relies on a classical background containing macroscopic apparatus, when there is
an experimental need to discuss a quantum-to-classical transition that took place
in the earliest moments after the big bang?
I’d also like to point out that there is currently a great opportunity to use
cosmology as a testing ground for quantum theory under new and extreme condi-
tions, at very short distances and very high energies. Inflationary cosmology, in
particular, is being used as a laboratory to test almost every modification of high-
energy physics that theorists are able to think of, and yet hardly anyone is using
it to test quantum theory itself. A handful of people, such as Daniel Sudarsky,
have considered how to use it to test collapse theories, and I have studied how to
use it to test for quantum nonequilibrium in the early universe.6 But there is a
vast amount of further work that could and should be done.
On the subject of gravity proper, there is the puzzle of black hole information
loss, and the alarming possibility that a closed system can evolve from a pure to
a mixed state. This problem has fuelled an immense amount of work in high-
energy physics and string theory, where it is hoped that ideas like the AdS/CFT
correspondence will provide a fundamentally unitary description of black hole for-
mation and evaporation. This is an important problem in quantum foundations,
and I’ve speculated, in a hidden-variables context, that Hawking radiation may
consist of nonequilibrium particles that violate the Born rule – where such states
can carry more information than conventional quantum states. That’s a line of
thought I hope to develop further.
The nonlocality of de Broglie-Bohm theory, and of hidden-variables theories
generally, points to the existence of an absolute time. This might help with
solving the notorious ‘problem of time’ in quantum gravity. But already at the
level of standard quantum gauge theories, in Minkowski spacetime, there is a ten-
sion with manifest Lorentz covariance, which requires the introduction of bosonic
‘ghost’ states with negative norm. I’ve always thought that the simplicity of
non-covariant and ghost-free gauges, such as the temporal gauge, in theories such
as quantum chromodynamics, points to the existence of an underlying preferred
state of rest, and I find the pilot-wave version of gauge field theory – at least as I
formulate it, with three-vector gauge fields on an Aristotelian spacetime – to be
more elegant than the standard version. I suspect that this line of thought may
be worth developing further.
6A. Valentini, ‘Inflationary cosmology as a probe of primordial quantum mechanics’, Phys.
Rev. D 82, 063513 (2010).
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I find it interesting that the AdS/CFT correspondence might be interpreted as
saying that physics is really based on a Yang-Mills gauge theory on flat spacetime.
It would be straightforward to make a de Broglie-Bohm version of the latter,
and one has to wonder how the underlying preferred frame would relate to the
emergent gravitational description.
Finally, it wouldn’t be surprising if one particular interpretation of quantum
theory proved to be crucial in developing a unified theory. But we won’t find out
for as long as quantum foundations remains so removed from the rest of physics.
Q16. Where would you put your money when it comes to predicting
the next major development in the foundations of quantum mechanics?
I suspect that the field of quantum foundations will develop properly only
when it starts attracting people who are fully conversant with modern theoretical
physics and its problems at an advanced level. There has been too much work
on elementary quantum mechanics, for example for simple entangled systems.
As I said in my reply to Question 15, there are important theoretical problems
concerning the early universe, black holes, and quantum gravity, and exploring
these further might lead to something important. But if I was asked to make one
guess, then if the history of physics is anything to go by, I’d say it’s most likely
that an experimental breakthrough will be needed to make further progress.
Some areas of theoretical physics have lost contact with physics as an ex-
perimental science, not only in the trivial sense that we don’t have experimental
anomalies that defy explanation with current theories, but also in the more sinister
sense that some theorists grossly underestimate the crucial role that experiment
has played in the historical development of our theories. Contary to folklore, no
really major advance in fundamental physics has ever occurred without guidance
from experiment. Theorists like to believe that pure thought can suffice, and they
often cite the example of general relativity in 1915, where textbooks and popular
accounts often give the impression that the correct perihelion motion of Mercury
came out of the theory as an unexpected bonus. The truth is, Einstein used the
observed perihelion motion to rule out his own pre-1915 theory of gravity. Once
he found the field equations that gave the correct perihelion motion, only then
could he be confident in the other predictions coming from those same equations.
And there are plenty of other examples. Schro¨dinger’s original wave equation was
beautiful and Lorentz invariant – and it gave the wrong energy levels for hydro-
gen. His non-relativistic version seemed less elegant, but gave the right energy
levels. And so on. If we look at the examples that theorists often cite, and if we
examine what really happened historically as opposed to the folklore in theoret-
ical textbooks, we always find that experiment played a much bigger role than
theorists like to believe.
So it’s likely that we need an experimental clue, an empirical window. To
that end, we should be trying harder to test quantum mechanics in genuinely
new and extreme domains. My ‘prediction’, for what it’s worth, is that we will
find an experimental breakdown of quantum theory. My guess is that quantum
theory will turn out to be an equilibrium case of a broader theory based on
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hidden variables, and this motivates me to suggest experiments searching for
nonequilibrium violations of quantum theory.
Q17. What single question about the foundations of quantum mechan-
ics would you put to an omniscient being?
My question would be: ‘Is it possible in principle to use entangled systems for
superluminal signalling?’
If the answer was ‘yes’, I would hope that I was on the right track (though
nonlinearities might yield similar effects). If the answer was ‘no’, I would abandon
deterministic hidden-variables theories.
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